A Framework for Understanding Wishful Thinking by Hicks, Daniel & Elliott, Kevin
A Framework for Understanding Wishful Thinking 
Daniel J. Hicks 
Science and Technology Policy Fellowships 
American Association for the Advancement of Science 
hicks.daniel.j@gmail.com 
 
Kevin C. Elliott 
Department of Philosophy 
Michigan State University 
kce@msu.edu 
Abstract 
While the science and values literature has seen recurrent concerns about wishful 
thinking, there have been few efforts to characterize this phenomenon. Based on a review of 
varieties of wishful thinking involved in climate skepticism, we argue that instances of 
wishful thinking can be fruitfully characterized in terms of the mechanisms that generate them 
and the problems associated with them. We highlight the array of mechanisms associated with 
wishful thinking, as well as the fact that it can be evaluated both from epistemic and ethical 
perspectives. We argue that it is doubtful that a single unified definition of wishful thinking 
can be developed. Moreover, the concept of wishful thinking can problematically focus 
excessive attention on individual and epistemic problems in science, to the exclusion of social 
and ethical problems. 
  
A Framework for Understanding Wishful Thinking 
1. Introduction 
In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, a generation of feminist philosophers of science and 
epistemologists produced a series of critiques of the ideal of value-free science — the view 
that non-epistemic values have no legitimate role to play in evaluating scientific hypotheses. 
In the 1990s, a number of critics put forward countercharges, defenses of the value-free ideal. 
Wishful thinking and cognate concepts were prominent in these countercharges. As Elisabeth 
Lloyd noted at the time, "There are several interrelated pronouncements that materialize with 
mystifying but strict regularity whenever 'feminism' and 'science' are used in the same breath. 
These include: feminists judge scientific results according to ideological standards instead of 
truth and evidence" (Lloyd 1996, 217). Similarly, Elizabeth Anderson characterized the views 
of Susan Haack (1993) as a concern that rejecting the value-free ideal “would allow inquiry to 
be infected by wishful thinking: people would feel entitled to infer from the fact that they 
wanted something to be true that it was actually true” (Anderson 1995, 32-33).  
By the 2010s, the “science wars” had settled into détente, and the science and values 
literature can no longer be characterized as a conflict between feminists and their critics. But 
concerns about wishful thinking still make regular appearances. For example, Heather 
Douglas justifies her distinction between direct and indirect roles for values in terms of 
concerns about “science … merely reflecting our wishes, our blinders, and our desires” (2009, 
102).  
While the science and values literature has seen recurrent concerns about wishful 
thinking, there have been few efforts to characterize this phenomenon. What, exactly, is 
supposed to be picked out by this term, and why is it a problem? In this paper, we address this 
lacuna. Based on a review of wishful thinking in the case of climate skepticism, we argue that 
instances of wishful thinking can be fruitfully characterized in terms of the mechanisms that 
generate them and the problems associated with them. We highlight the array of mechanisms 
associated with wishful thinking, as well as the fact that it can involve both epistemic and 
ethical problems. We argue that it is doubtful that a single descriptive definition of wishful 
thinking can be developed that reflects its usage in the science-and-values literature, and that 
using the concept of wishful thinking can have the problematic consequence of focusing 
attention on individual and epistemic problems in science, to the exclusion of social and 
ethical problems.  
 
2. “Wishful Thinking” in the Science and Values Literature  
As noted above, in the 1990s, wishful thinking primarily served as a countercharge, 
used against feminist philosophers (and others) who were critical of the ideal of value-free 
science: rejecting this ideal, it was thought, opened the door to wishful thinking.  By contrast, 
in recent work, wishful thinking has come to act as a constraint that is adopted by critics of 
the value-free ideal themselves. For example, Matthew Brown has argued that opponents of 
the value-free ideal have continued to insist on what he calls the “lexical priority” of evidence 
over values because they have wanted to avoid the possibility of scientists falling prey to the 
problem of wishful thinking (Brown 2013, 829; see also Brown 2017). Inmaculada de Melo-
Martín and Kristen Intemann have proposed what they call the Wishful Thinking Criterion as 
a constraint on acceptable accounts of values in science: “The ways in which contextual 
values are claimed to operate at the core of scientific reasoning must avoid the problem of 
wishful thinking” (2016, 503). One of us has also held up wishful thinking as a primary 
example of the sorts of value influences that must be avoided in scientific reasoning 
([redacted]).  
Despite recurrent references to the problem of wishful thinking, the precise nature of 
the problem remains surprisingly unclear. Strictly speaking, wishful thinking would seem to 
be the fallacy of moving from the desire for something to be true — the wish — to the belief 
that it is true, despite inadequate evidence (Maller 2013). Interpreted in this way, it seems 
unlikely that scientists would deliberately engage in such fallacious reasoning (Elliott 2017, 
13). For this reason, Haack argues that “wishful thinking doesn’t work directly, but by 
distorting the evidence to enable you to give too much credence to propositions you would 
like to be  true, too little credence to propositions you would prefer to be untrue” (Haack 
2003, 292). Thus, Haack appears to treat wishful thinking in science as more closely related to 
the widely discussed psychological phenomenon of confirmation bias.  
While there are advantages to equating wishful thinking with important concepts from 
cognitive psychology like confirmation bias, other philosophers have used the notion of 
wishful thinking in a wide variety of ways that are not captured by this approach.1 For 
                                                             
1 Footnote removed for anonymous review. 
example, Bela Szabados (1973) contrasts wishful thinking with self-deception, where those 
who fall prey to self-deception display unconscious efforts to deny opposing evidence but 
those who engage in wishful thinking are ultimately responsive to conflicting evidence when 
they are confronted with it. Brown (2013) defines wishful thinking in terms of being dogmatic 
and unwilling to revise conclusions in response to contrary evidence. Elizabeth Anderson has 
characterized wishful thinking both in a narrow way, as feeling entitled to infer from the fact 
that one wants something to be true to the fact that it is true (Anderson 1995, 33), and in the 
broader sense of “wishing away” contrary evidence (Anderson 2004, 8). Kevin Elliott takes a 
similar approach of distinguishing the narrow definition of wishful thinking from a range of 
other activities associated with it: “using ‘rigged’ methods that generate predetermined 
outcomes, ignoring evidence that conflicts with one’s preferred conclusions, and repeating 
objections over and over even after they have been addressed” (Elliott 2017, 13). 
Given the complexity of deciding how best to characterize wishful thinking, our 
strategy in this paper is to illustrate the wide range of activities that are associated with this 
phenomenon in some way. Even though wishful thinking is typically regarded as a behavior 
of individuals, we think it is important to avoid starting out with overly narrow conceptions of 
what it might involve. Thus, in the following section we will deliberately consider a wide 
range of activities related to wishful thinking that incorporate both individual and social 
phenomena. With those activities in view, we will propose a framework for characterizing and 
reflecting on the variety of phenomena that could potentially be called “wishful thinking.” 
  
3. Wishful Thinking and Climate Change 
In this section, we examine climate skepticism — that is, rejection of the mainstream 
climate science position that climate change is real, anthropogenic, and is having serious 
environmental and socio-economic consequences — as a paradigm of wishful thinking. We 
regard climate skepticism as an excellent case study insofar as it is a significant contemporary 
social issue; it is a case in which major public figures deny well-established scientific claims, 
seemingly because they wish those claims were not true; and there are numerous analyses of 
the causes of this skepticism for us to drawn on (see citations throughout this section). We 
will examine this case with the goal of developing a framework for characterizing the 
different kinds of activities associated with wishful thinking in the next section. The 
overarching theme of this section is that climate skepticism has been explained in terms of a 
wide variety of different kinds of individual- and social-level processes, and that climate 
skepticism involves both epistemic and ethical problems.   
In their influential book Merchants of Doubt, historians Naomi Oreskes and Erik 
Conway (2010) elucidate a wide variety of strategies used to promote climate skepticism, and 
they explore some of the underlying factors that may have encouraged this skepticism. First, 
just as tobacco executives consciously lied to the public about the health effects of their 
products, Oreskes and Conway indicate that some activities of climate skeptics also appear to 
involve conscious misrepresentations of scientific evidence. Oreskes and Conway give the 
example of a report created for a think tank called the George C. Marshall Institute by 
prominent physicists Robert Jastrow, Fred Seitz, and Bill Nierenberg (2010, 186-189). 
According to figures within the George H. W. Bush White House, this report, which placed 
the blame for climate change on increased solar output rather than greenhouse gases, played a 
major role in halting action by the Bush administration to address climate change. 
Unfortunately, the report included fairly blatant manipulations of the available evidence, such 
as including portions of a figure created by renowned climate scientist James Hansen but 
leaving out other portions of the figure that did not fit with the report’s argument. The report 
also failed to acknowledge that if the climate were as sensitive to increased solar output as the 
physicists claimed, then the climate should be highly sensitive to greenhouse gases as well; 
Oreskes and Conway insist that the authors of the paper “would of course have known this” 
(2010, 189).  
While some of the activities displayed by climate skeptics like the Marshall Institute 
physicists appear to have been conscious, much of their underlying skepticism may have been 
driven by unconscious psychological mechanisms. For example, Oreskes and Conway 
emphasize that many of the prominent physicists who worked to promote climate skepticism 
were passionate opponents of Communism who thought that environmental regulations 
pushed the country in that direction. Thus, it is plausible that their opposition to regulations 
unconsciously influenced how they responded to evidence for climate change (2010, 248ff; 
Lahsen 2013). This could have been the result of mechanisms like Dan Kahan’s (2012) model 
of identity-protective cognition — on which individuals reject evidence that threatens the 
defining beliefs of “people like them.” Similarly, George Marshall’s book Don’t Even Think 
about It (2015) explains climate skepticism based on mechanisms such as confirmation bias, 
availability bias, and optimism bias.  
In addition to conscious and unconscious mechanisms at the level of individual 
cognition, some analyses view climate change skepticism as driven by social and institutional 
factors. For example, consider Farrell’s (2015) analysis of industry funding and climate 
skepticism.  Using a combination of network analysis and text mining, Farrell argues, inter 
alia, that funding of skeptical blogs and organizations by ExxonMobil and the Koch Family 
Foundations has supported four common climate skeptical arguments, such as the argument 
that increased atmospheric CO2 is beneficial (Farrell 2015, 4 and fig. 4). Sociologists like 
Robert Brulle, Riley Dunlap, and Aaron McCright have also studied the ways in which 
funding from powerful corporations and individuals has equipped right-wing think tanks and 
front groups with climate skeptical arguments (Brulle 2014; McCright and Dunlap 2010). 
These analyses do not focus on the reasoning of any individual as such, but instead examine 
social-level trends and the activities of collective agents and institutions.  
The analyses discussed in the last few paragraphs are primarily concerned with the 
epistemic harms of climate skepticism — namely, manufacturing doubt and widespread false 
beliefs about climate change. These epistemic harms are particularly worrisome because of 
the social and economic problems that they generate. Some analyses of climate skepticism 
explicitly connect epistemic and ethical problems. Like Farrell, Biddle and Leuschner’s 
(2015) analysis of climate skepticism focuses on the way collective agents promote skeptical 
arguments — specifically, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) offering a 10,000 USD 
reward “to any scientist who provides results that contradict the fourth assessment report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)” (262). While Biddle and Leuschner 
characterize this as promoting “epistemically detrimental dissent” from the mainstream 
climate science position, they argue that this dissent is problematic in part because of ethical 
factors, namely, the way it would contribute to an unjust distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of fossil fuel use and climate change. Specifically, following Wilholt (2009), Biddle 
and Leuschner argue that AEI’s offer promotes research that “involves intolerance for 
producer risks at the expense of public risks” (273), that is, reducing risk to the fossil fuel 
industry while increasing risk for the general public. On this analysis, dissenting research is 
not problematic solely for epistemic reasons, but also in part because it is associated with a 
lopsided and unjust distribution of risk.  
Another example of the ways in which ethical and epistemic problems intertwine 
stems from the harassment and persecution of scientists. For example, Ben Santer, the 
convening lead author of one of the chapters in the 1995 report of the IPCC, was subjected to 
harsh criticism because of his alleged attempts to modify the chapter at the last minute. These 
attacks were subsequently shown to be completely unwarranted, but they caused a great deal 
of personal upheaval for Santer and wasted the time of many other scientists who came to his 
aid (Oreskes and Conway 2010, 208-213). Personal attacks on scientists who report 
unwelcome findings are common in many areas of environmental science (Elliott 2016).  
Biddle et al. (2017) argue that these sorts of attacks are both ethically problematic 
(insofar as they cause inappropriate harm and stress to scientists) and epistemically 
problematic. In part, this is because of the obvious ways in which scientists are not able to be 
as productive when they are fending off attacks. But Biddle et al. (2017) argue that a 
particularly important problem is the way harassment is likely to foster epistemic vices in 
scientists and scientific communities. When they are under attack, their curiosity is likely to 
be degraded, and they are likely to become overly timid—afraid to pursue important but 
potentially threatening lines of investigation. Thus, Biddle et al. show that the wishful 
thinking associated with climate skepticism intertwines ethical and epistemic failings. 
  
4. A Framework for Understanding Wishful Thinking 
Our overview of climate skepticism illustrates that in real-life scenarios, wishful 
thinking manifests itself in a complex combination of ways. As highlighted in our review of 
“wishful thinking” in the science and values literature, it is not entirely clear which activities 
should fall under the rubric of wishful thinking, and they are intertwined in practice. The 
conscious activities of individuals are influenced by their unconscious cognitive processes as 
well as by social and institutional structures, and these structures are in turn influenced by the 
activities of other individuals. Moreover, these individual and social processes incorporate 
multiple sorts of problems. Individual climate skeptics display both epistemic and ethical 
failings, and these failings in turn interact with a variety of problems associated with their 
social context. In an effort to bring some clarity to the complexity of wishful thinking, in this 
section we propose a general framework for distinguishing different types of activities 
associated with wishful thinking.  
Our framework distinguishes different kinds of wishful thinking in terms of two 
components: mechanisms and problems. Mechanisms comprise various entities and their 
activities, including specific kinds of causal interactions among the entities (Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver 2000). Although, as noted above in our review of the science and values 
literature, many previous accounts of wishful thinking have focused on the thought processes 
of individuals, our framework makes no a priori assumptions that any particular kind of entity 
must or must not be involved in wishful thinking, nor what kinds of activities they must 
engage in. As illustrated by our discussion of climate skepticism, the mechanisms associated 
with wishful thinking can include cognitive processes "in the heads" of individuals, 
interactions between individuals and social groups or institutions, or involve only collective 
agents.2  
We do suggest that it is often useful to distinguish between individual and social 
mechanisms, as well as between conscious and unconscious ones. Some discussions of cases 
of wishful thinking focus on individuals, whether concrete (for example, a particular scientist 
in an historical narrative, as in Oreskes and Conway 2010) or generic (for example, a generic 
                                                             
2 There is a body of recent literature on mechanistic explanation, including rival conceptions of mechanisms 
and a vigorous debate over the limits of mechanistic explanation (Hunemann 2015; Brigandt, Green, and 
O’Malley forthcoming). To be clear, we do not intend to make any controversial claims here about what 
mechanisms are or whether all explanations are mechanistic. Instead, we draw on the general concept of a 
mechanism — a productive arrangement of entities and their activities — as useful terminology for comparing 
and contrasting the different kinds of processes that are variously called “wishful thinking.” 
individual in a game-theoretic analysis). Others focus on collective agents (such as 
corporations, as in Biddle and Leuschner 2015, or government agencies), networks of social 
interactions (such as a network of blogs, as in Farrell 2015, or massively distributed research 
collaborations; see Winsberg et al. 2014), or social institutions (such as disciplinary 
publication standards or patterns of research funding). Still other discussions of cases of 
wishful thinking describe multilevel mechanisms, which include both individuals and the 
social contexts in which they act. For example, game-theoretic models frequently involve 
individual agents (or individualized collective agents) making decisions under socially-
imposed constraints. All together, distinguishing the various mechanisms involved lets us 
distinguish these different senses of “wishful thinking.”  
Characterizations of wishful thinking are incomplete, however, if they focus only on a 
description of mechanisms without identifying the problems associated with those 
mechanisms. We take it to be obvious that "wishful thinking" is a thick concept, with both 
"world-guided" descriptive and "action-guiding" evaluative content (Williams 2005, 47ff).  
"Wishful thinking" describes how knowledge has (not) been produced in a particular case; it 
also (generally and for the most part) implies that some agents or institutions operated in a 
problematic fashion.   
In all of the examples that we have discussed in this paper, wishful thinking obviously 
involves epistemic problems, where “epistemic” covers at least the pursuit of truth, empirical 
adequacy, or explanation/understanding, and perhaps also the pursuit of practical knowledge 
or know-how. The case of climate skepticism illustrates, however, that when the full range of 
mechanisms underlying wishful thinking are considered, they can involve not only epistemic 
problems but also ethical ones. For example, the harassment of scientists such as Ben Santer 
is ethically bad, independent of its epistemic aspects. Ethical problems can have epistemic 
consequences, as when harassment causes scientists to become epistemically timid. And 
“intolerance for producer risks at the expense of public risks” entangles epistemic and ethical 
problems.  Epistemic and ethical problems may be independent in some cases, causally 
related in others, and conceptually entangled in still others. The ethical problems with wishful 
thinking may be constitutive or intrinsic (in some sense, “internal to” the scientific 
community), contextual or extrinsic (a matter of the relationship between the scientific 
community and its broader social context) (Longino 1990, 4ff; Scheinke et al. 2009, 322ff), or 
both. In general, the relationship between epistemic and ethical problems of wishful thinking 
is complex, and space does not permit us to consider this relationship further here.  
While the mechanisms involved in wishful thinking might seem more central to the 
concept than the problems associated with it, both the epistemic and the ethical problems 
associated with wishful thinking have provided much of the motivation for philosophers of 
science to discuss it. For example, Susan Haack closes her critical response to feminist 
epistemology with concerns about political persecution:  
Have we forgotten already that in Nineteen Eighty-Four it was thoughtcrime to believe 
that two plus two is four if the Party ruled otherwise? This is no trivial verbal quibble, but a 
matter, epistemologically, of the integrity of inquiry and, politically, of freedom of thought. 
Needlessly sacrificing these ideals would not help women; it would hurt humanity. (Haack 
1993, 38) 
It is clear that her concerns about wishful thinking encompass not only its epistemic 
implications for achieving scientific goals but also its ethical implications, both for the 
scientific community and for society at large. 
  
5. Lessons  
Our framework for understanding wishful thinking suggests two major lessons for 
those working with this concept. First, it is doubtful that a precise, unified definition of 
wishful thinking can be developed that reflects its recent usage in the science-and-values 
literature. Wishful thinking might be understood strictly as the behavior of an individual who 
consciously infers a particular conclusion because they would like it to be true. But scientists 
rarely commit such fallacious reasoning in a deliberate way (Elliott 2017, 13). Thus, when 
wishful thinking is discussed in the context of scientific practice, the term is almost always 
used in a more ambiguous fashion, involving a wider variety of mechanisms: dogmatism, or 
disingenuousness, or confirmation bias, or other forms of motivated reasoning. Therefore, as 
the term “wishful thinking” is used, it does not lend itself to a unified definition in terms of a 
single mechanism or phenomenon. Instead, we suggest that it typically acts as a generic 
placeholder for illegitimate influences of values on science. This interpretation accords well 
with its rhetorical use in the science and values literature, where it has been employed as a 
thick ethical concept to warn that particular influences of values are inappropriate. 
An important consequence of interpreting wishful thinking as a generic placeholder, 
though, is that its content becomes unclear or equivocal. Opponents of the value-free ideal do 
not agree on precisely what influences of values are appropriate or not, so they would end up 
disagreeing about which cases count as wishful thinking. For example, Douglas (2009) argues 
that scientists fall prey to wishful thinking when they allow values to influence their reasoning 
in a direct way, but not when they relegate values to an indirect role in their reasoning. 
However, this distinction between direct and indirect roles is contested (Elliott 2013; Elliott 
and Richards 2017). Moreover, even if one treats the distinction as settled, some have argued 
that direct roles for values are not always problematic and that indirect roles for values can be 
problematic (de Melo-Martin and Intemann 2016; Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Steel and 
Whyte 2012). In recent work, philosophers of science have argued that the distinction 
between appropriate and inappropriate roles for values should be based on whether the value 
influences are made sufficiently transparent (Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Elliott 2017), 
whether they have received democratic endorsement (Elliott 2017; Intemann 2015), whether 
they do not violate epistemic standards (Steel 2017; Steel and Whyte 2012), whether they 
jointly satisfy epistemic and ethical standards (Brown 2017; Kourany 2010), or whether there 
is an appropriate fit between social ends and scientific means (Hicks 2014). If “wishful 
thinking” is merely shorthand for the inappropriate influence of values in science, then these 
distinct, incompatible accounts of values in science produce distinct, incompatible senses of 
“wishful thinking.”  
The second lesson that can be gleaned from our framework is that there are significant 
dangers to using the concept of wishful thinking. This is important to recognize, because even 
if wishful thinking does not have a single definition that fits with the science-and-values 
literature, one might still think that it could serve a useful rhetorical role. In other words, 
critics of the value-free ideal could continue to emphasize that this ideal can be abandoned 
without allowing wishful thinking, where “wishful thinking” refers in a general way to 
problematic forms of reasoning. Alternatively, one might propose to reserve “wishful 
thinking” for one specific problematic mechanism (say, confirmation bias). A disadvantage of 
this approach is that it does not accord well with the general way in which “wishful thinking” 
has been used in the science-and-values literature to represent inappropriate influences of 
values on science, but it would remove the risk of equivocation.  
However, our framework highlights two dangers of either approach to using the 
concept of wishful thinking. First, insofar as it is understood primarily as operating through 
individual-level mechanisms — whether by implicit assumption or explicit definition — the 
concept can distract people’s attention from processes that operate at a social or structural 
level. In this paper we have seen how values can cause illegitimate harassment of scientists, 
discourage scientists from exploring sensitive topics, and encourage widespread media 
attention to flawed or questionable claims. If discussions of illegitimate influences of values 
in science are put in terms of “wishful thinking,” and this concept focuses our attention on the 
ways individuals are influenced by values, it could distract from crucial discussions about 
social and institution-level mechanisms. 
Another danger of employing the concept of wishful thinking is that it can focus 
attention solely on epistemic problems in science and distract attention from accompanying 
ethical problems. This is especially important, given that our discussion of the problems 
associated with wishful thinking highlighted the importance of ethical problems. Recall Susan 
Haack’s concerns about political suppression, expressed in terms of references to Nineteen 
Eighty-Four. It is clear that she worries that abandoning the value-free ideal could result not 
only in epistemological problems but also political problems. Moreover, as Biddle, Kidd, and 
Leuschner have pointed out, it can be misleading to characterize epistemic problems without 
attention to the accompanying ethical problems (Biddle and Leuschner 2015; Biddle et al. 
2017; Leuschner 2016).  
 
6. Conclusion  
Based on a review of climate skepticism, we have developed a framework for 
understanding wishful thinking. We have argued that instances of wishful thinking can be 
fruitfully characterized based on the mechanisms that generate them and the problems 
associated with them. We noted that the mechanisms associated with wishful thinking 
encompass a wide array of entities and activities, including individual and social entities as 
well as conscious and unconscious cognitive processes. Based on our framework, we 
suggested two lessons for those seeking to understand wishful thinking. First, it is doubtful 
that a single unified definition of wishful thinking can be developed that reflects its recent 
usage in the science-and-values literature. Second, while the concept of wishful thinking 
could still either be given a stipulative definition or serve as a generic placeholder for 
illegitimate influences of values on science, there are dangers that this usage can focus 
attention on individual and epistemic problems to the exclusion of social and ethical factors.       
We suggest two avenues for responding to the vagueness of the concept of wishful 
thinking and its potential to distract attention from social and ethical problems in science. One 
option is to stop using the concept entirely. The primary purpose of recent discussions of 
wishful thinking in the philosophy-of-science literature has been to show that values can be 
incorporated into scientific reasoning without violating basic standards of good reasoning. But 
this point can be made without talking about wishful thinking; one can simply emphasize that 
values can influence scientific reasoning without violating these basic standards. Why not 
stop using a vague and confusing term and instead make one’s claims more explicitly?  
Nevertheless, one might think that there is important rhetorical value to talking about 
wishful thinking. After all, the claim that one can incorporate values into scientific reasoning 
without falling prey to wishful thinking is much catchier than the claim that one can 
incorporate values into scientific reasoning without violating basic standards of good 
reasoning. Moreover, by talking about wishful thinking one can link up with previous 
literature on this topic.  
For those who think that the rhetorical power of “wishful thinking” makes it worth 
preserving, our alternative recommendation is to be careful to provide appropriate caveats 
when using the concept. One important caveat is to clarify that when one talks about wishful 
thinking in the scientific context one is typically speaking about an array of inappropriate 
activities and not a single, clearly-defined phenomenon. Another important caveat is to 
acknowledge that, if wishful thinking is conceptualized primarily as an epistemic failing of 
individuals, it is not the only problem that we should be worried about when thinking about 
the influences of values on science. We need to think carefully not only about the ways in 
which values can cause epistemic problems for individuals but also social and ethical 
problems.            
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